From Egoism to Altruism in Groups

Rachid El-Azouzi (), Eitan Altman (), Ilaria Brunetti, Majed Haddad and Houssem Gaiech
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Rachid El-Azouzi: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Eitan Altman: INRIA Maestro, Maestro
Ilaria Brunetti: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Majed Haddad: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Houssem Gaiech: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)

Chapter Chapter 2 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 25-43 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents a new formulation which not only covers the fully non- cooperative behavior and the fully cooperative behavior, but also the fully altruistic behaviour. To do so, we make use of the evolutionary game theory which we extend to cover this kind of behavior. The major focus of this work is to study how the level of cooperation impacts the profile of population as well as the global performance of the system. Equilibrium of the system through the notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategies and study the effect of transmission cost and cooperation level.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-24455-2_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_2

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