Evolutionary Games in Interacting Communities

Nesrine Ben Khalifa, Rachid El-Azouzi () and Yezekael Hayel
Additional contact information
Nesrine Ben Khalifa: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Rachid El-Azouzi: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Yezekael Hayel: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)

Chapter Chapter 3 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 45-71 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The major question posed in the EGT literature is related to the stability of a steady state which leads to a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Much of work on evolution has studied the relationship between the steady state of the replicator dynamics and the ESS concept.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-24455-2_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030244552

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().