Coupled State Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games

Ilaria Brunetti, Yezekael Hayel and Eitan Altman ()
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Ilaria Brunetti: University of Cote d’Azur, INRIA
Yezekael Hayel: University of Cote d’Azur, INRIA
Eitan Altman: University of Cote d’Azur, INRIA

Chapter Chapter 5 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 95-107 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this work we want to extend the EGT models by introducing the concept of individual state. We analyze a particular simple case, in which we associate a state to each player, and we suppose that this state determines the set of available actions. We consider deterministic stationary policies and we suppose that the choice of a policy determines the fitness of the player and it impacts the evolution of the state.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-24455-2_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_5

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