“Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games

Gideon Blocq () and Ariel Orda ()
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Gideon Blocq: Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Viterbi Faculty of Electrical Engineering
Ariel Orda: Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Viterbi Faculty of Electrical Engineering

Chapter Chapter 9 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 167-184 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract To date, game theoretic models have been employed in virtually all networking contexts. These include control tasks at the network layer, such as flow control and routing (e.g., [14, 36, 161, 191, 202, 224] and references therein), as well as numerous studies on control tasks at the link and MAC layers. A fundamental assumption in all of these referenced studies is that the selfish agents compete over resources in the network and aim to optimize their own performance; agents do not care (either way) about the performance of their competitors. However, and typically in the context of routing, scenarios exist in which this assumption is not warranted.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_9

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