Market Entry and Market Partition

Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest, Jeananne Nicholls, Kurt Schimmel and Sifeng Liu
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Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest: Slippery Rock University
Jeananne Nicholls: Slippery Rock University
Kurt Schimmel: Slippery Rock University
Sifeng Liu: Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics

Chapter Chapter 4 in Managerial Decision Making, 2020, pp 65-82 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter, which is based on (Forrest et al. 2017), investigates market entry of small firms and market characteristics that motivate such firms to penetrate markets. By emphasizing firm scales, this chapter provides a dynamic picture of entrant-incumbent relations and conditions on how, when, and where small entrants will penetrate markets. Conceptually, this chapter generalizes and unifies both resource partitioning and mutual forbearance theories into one with much increased utility for applications. It is shown that (1) penetration into markets is possible only when smaller entrants solidify large incumbents’ positions while target niches large incumbent firms cannot occupy, (2) market evolution can be measured by either integration or modularity of the large incumbents, etc.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-28064-2_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-28064-2_4

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