More Than Two Players

Manfred J. Holler () and Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg
Barbara Klose-Ullmann: Center of Conflict Resolution

Chapter Chapter 11 in Scissors and Rock, 2020, pp 195-211 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract If there are more than two players in a game, then there is a potential for forming coalitions. The CoreCore is the most prominent solution concept in this case. It assigns payoff vectors to the players. However, the Core of an n-person game can be empty or contain an infinite number of possible outcome vectors. In this chapter, applying the CoreCore to a network gameNetwork games illustrates this problem. As a consequence, alternative solution concepts are briefly discussed: the Stable Set concept, proposed by von NeumannVon Neumann, Johnand Morgenstern,Morgenstern, Oskar as the Solution; Bargaining Sets that are based on objections and (successful) counterobjections; the Kernel and the Nucleolus. Results are confronted with the problem of competition and cooperationCooperation in the triad.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_11

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