The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?

Manfred J. Holler () and Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg
Barbara Klose-Ullmann: Center of Conflict Resolution

Chapter Chapter 3 in Scissors and Rock, 2020, pp 39-57 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Prisoners’ DilemmaPrisoners’ Dilemma serves to introduce and discuss the concepts of players, strategies, payoffs, game formGame form (event matrix)Event matrix, game matrix, and game treeGame tree, all of which specify the normal form (or strategic form)Strategic form and the sequential form of strategic interaction. The Prisoners’ DilemmaPrisoners’ Dilemma game is illustrated by real-world cases when a state (or crown) witness chooses the dominant strategyStrategydominant -. In 2002, launched by the US Department of Justice to look into alleged price-fixing in the DRAM computer chip market, Micron executives received amnesty because they agreed to testify as state witnesses against the price cartelCartel. The investigation resulted in fines to Samsung, Infineon, Hynix and Elpida Memory equaling altogether $731 million for illegal price-fixing, and thereby violating antitrust law. In April 2002, Sotheby’s chairman, Alfred Taubman, and its chief executive, Diana Brooks, were found guilty of conspiring with Christie’s to fix commissions. Mr. Taubman served ten months of a one-year prison sentence; Ms. Brooks was given six months’ house arrest, a $350,000 fine, and 1000 h of community service. She pleaded guilty to price-fixing and then testified against her boss, Alfred Taubman. No one was charged at Christie’s, which had blown the whistle on the commission-fixing. These results propose one to ask: “Who are the players,” and “Do they have dominant strategies.” With respect to the second question, we examined Sun Tzu’sSun Tzu strategies of war and Tosca’sTosca tragic fate.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_3

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