The Nash Equilibrium

Manfred J. Holler () and Barbara Klose-Ullmann
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Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg
Barbara Klose-Ullmann: Center of Conflict Resolution

Chapter Chapter 4 in Scissors and Rock, 2020, pp 59-74 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Here a definition of the Nash equilibriumNash equilibrium is presented, regarded as the most prominent solution concept for non-cooperative games. Information requirements such as common knowledge of rationality (CKR)Common Knowledge of Rationality (CKR) and consistent-aligned beliefs (CAB)Consistent-Aligned Beliefs (CAB) are discussed. A historical note on Nash and his equilibrium concept accompanies the definition, including a reference to the movie “Beautiful Mind.” For illustration, the concept is applied to the QWERTY-DSK game of standardization—and to the Kama Sutra.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_4

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