Chaos, Too Many and Too Few

Manfred J. Holler () and Barbara Klose-Ullmann
Additional contact information
Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg
Barbara Klose-Ullmann: Center of Conflict Resolution

Chapter Chapter 6 in Scissors and Rock, 2020, pp 97-112 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract If there are more than one Nash equilibria, then often players face a serious coordination problem: “too many and too few.” In the Market Congestion GameMarket Congestion Game, an (equilibrium)Equilibrium outcome can be expected featuring a Market B, without sellers, while too many sellers crowd Market A, resulting in an inefficient outcome. In the Volunteer’s DilemmaVolunteer’s Dilemma, coordination is likely to fail because players want to profit off “somebody else” volunteering. The dilemma implies that you only benefit from the volunteering of others if you do not volunteer yourself.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-44823-3_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030448233

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().