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Evidence from Monitoring on Tax Incentives on the Performance Related Pay in Italy

Massimo Resce () and Enrico Sestili ()
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Massimo Resce: INAPP - National Institute for the Analysis of Public Policies
Enrico Sestili: INAPP - National Institute for the Analysis of Public Policies

Chapter Chapter 13 in The Collective Dimensions of Employment Relations, 2021, pp 303-344 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Italy the Cross-Sectoral Agreement (Protocollo 1993), signed 23 July 1993, promoted new forms of decentralized bargaining. One of the aims was to stimulate the productivity growth in the second level of bargaining, by linking wages dynamics to productivity. Recently, the Italian government has encouraged the second-level bargaining through the provision of tax incentives related to performance bonuses and corporate welfare programmes set forth in the company/territorial collective bargaining agreement. Monitoring measures were also envisaged through a special instrument for collecting summary data and the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy activated a Repository for this purpose. The paper proposes some analyses of the Italian second-level bargaining, using data collected by this Repository in the two-years period 2016–2017. In particular, it focuses on the choices made by companies to improve labour productivity, proposing an analysis by sector and by territory, trying to highlight the positive and negative impacts of this policy.

Keywords: Collective bargaining; Industrial and labour relations; Performance related pay; Performance-based bonus; Labour productivity; Wages; Decentralized bargaining; Labour market policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-75532-4_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-75532-4_13

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