Market Institutions, Prices and Distribution of Surplus: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Nick Feltovich and Nejat Anbarci ()

Chapter Chapter 10 in Bargaining, 2022, pp 203-225 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we examine three market institutions using theory and experiment. Under “posting”, sellers post non-negotiable prices, seen by buyers who then choose whom to visit.Under “haggling”, prices are not posted, but emerge via bilateral negotiation or bidding. Under “flexible pricing”, prices are posted but are flexible upwards or downwards (as under haggling). Observed market performance differs from standard-theory predictions in systematic ways. These differences may be due in part to deviations in the bargaining and auction stages. Bargaining under both haggling and flexible pricing favours the seller compared to standard bargaining solutions, while auction results favour the seller, but less than implied by the theory. Disagreements occur about 10% of the time in bargaining and about 3% in auctions.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030766665

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().