Bargaining in Healthcare Markets: Applications of Nash-in-Nash and Extensions

Matthew Grennan and Ashley Swanson ()
Additional contact information
Ashley Swanson: Columbia University

Chapter Chapter 12 in Bargaining, 2022, pp 249-270 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Many prices in healthcare markets are determined by business-to-business negotiations among healthcare providers, producers, and payers. Combined with the rich data that has become available to healthcare researchers, this has led to a growing body of empirical research on bargaining in healthcare markets, particularly in the development of structural models of bargaining that researchers can estimate from data and use to consider counterfactual policies. In this chapter, we review these models and their importance for healthcare and bargaining research more broadly.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030766665

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().