Bargaining and War

Bahar Leventoğlu ()
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Bahar Leventoğlu: Duke University

Chapter Chapter 14 in Bargaining, 2022, pp 293-315 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract War destroys the resources of all engaged parties. Therefore, the surplus parties can divide after war is always smaller than the surplus they could divide before war. Then why do rational actors not agree to a negotiated settlement they would all prefer to the war outcome? This question constitutes the central puzzle in the rationalist paradigm on war. This puzzle manifests itself in bargaining models of war as in Fearon’s (1995) pioneering work “Rationalist Explanations for War.”

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_14

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