Reputational Bargaining

Jack Fanning and Alexander Wolitzky

Chapter Chapter 3 in Bargaining, 2022, pp 35-60 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We survey the literature on reputation-building in bargaining games. Topics include classical results of Myerson, Abreu, and Gul; extensions to more complex environments and forms of incomplete information; applications to search markets and mediation; and experimental evidence.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-76666-5_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_3

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