Institutional Complementarity, Not Rent, Is the Recipe of Brazil’s Economic Failures

Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos ()
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Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos: University of Copenhagen

Chapter Chapter 6 in Not Paying the Rent, 2021, pp 95-103 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This piece responds to the chapters presenting the Brazil case study on development, rent, and the convoy model. The prime argument is that, differently from the laid out in the case study, institutional disarray is the actual root cause of the country’s failed developmental endeavours. National institutions act beyond their democratically assigned roles, sponsoring many individuals to appropriate State’s assets illegally. This disproportionate distribution of benefits goes much beyond conceding advantages to rentiers. As a result, the official policies are influenced the interest of the groups that have taken the state by storm, reinforcing the unbalanced system by complementarity.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-78861-2_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-78861-2_6

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