QV-Investment Competition (and PPR Competition)

Richard S. Markovits ()
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Richard S. Markovits: University of Texas School of Law

Chapter Chapter 5 in Welfare Economics and Antitrust Policy - Vol. I, 2021, pp 83-110 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Antitrust-law scholarship and antitrust-policy scholarship have rarely paid attention to the concept of the intensity of investment-competition in any relevant area of product-space. This study reveals that this omission is unfortunate—that some conduct may be rendered illegal or lawful, economically inefficient or efficient, liberal-moral-rights-violative, or undesirable or desirable from the perspective of one or more conceptions of the moral good by its impact on the intensity of investment-competition.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-79812-3_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-79812-3_5

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