The Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions

Richard S. Markovits ()
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Richard S. Markovits: University of Texas School of Law

Chapter Chapter 6 in Welfare Economics and Antitrust Policy - Vol. I, 2021, pp 111-115 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter analyzes the concepts of classical and antitrust (economic) markets. More specifically, Sects. 6.1 and 6.2 respectively explain why the definitions of “classical economic markets” and so-called antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary not just at their peripheries but comprehensively. In so doing, Sect. 6.1 reveal the “cost”-ineffectiveness of the conventional approaches to antitrust-law application and antitrust-policy design, which pay considerable attention to the pre-choice and/or post-choice magnitudes of parameters whose definition assumes that relevant markets can be defined non-arbitrarily (e.g., on perpetrator-market-share, conventional-market-concentration, and HHI figures) and (2) explain why this study’s policy-analysis protocols do not instruct the analyst to base decisions on the magnitude of any market-aggregated parameter.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-79812-3_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-79812-3_6

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