Policy Coordination Between Wages and Exchange Rates in Singapore

Ying Wu ()
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Ying Wu: Salisbury University

Chapter 48 in Encyclopedia of Finance, 2022, pp 1137-1148 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Singapore’s unique experience in macroeconomic management involves the government’s engagement in a tripartite collective bargaining and its influence on the macroeconomic policy game in wages and exchange rates in response to inflation and output volatility. The period from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s features the policy game with a Nash equilibrium in the level of wages and exchange rates and a non-Nash equilibrium in wage growth and exchange rate appreciations. Based on the empirical evidence in the period, the models used in this study suggest that wage and exchange-rate police are a pair of complements both at their levels (Nash equilibrium) and at their percentage changes (non-Nash equilibrium).

Keywords: Effective exchange rates; Collective bargaining; Nash equilibrium; Unit labor cost National Wages Council; Monetary Authority of Singapore (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E51 E61 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-91231-4_48

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