Security-Deterrence “and” Preemptive Measures

Satya P. Das
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Satya P. Das: University of South Florida

Chapter Chapter 11 in Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures, 2022, pp 461-480 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter analyzes three different scenarios of terrorism. Compared to Chaps. H and 9 , the distinguishing characteristic of these models is that each scenario features both defensive and offensive counter-terrorism measures within a single framework. The first model examines the behavior of a terrorist organization as a network of nodes and asks how intelligence and infiltration, as offensive and defensive counter-terrorism measures, affect the size of and connectivity within a terrorist network. The second combines the basic game-theoretic security-deterrence and preemptionPreemption models developed in Chaps. H and 9 . The last model considers an expansion of tasks by a terrorist organization: to non-terrorist activities. Thus, the organization chooses terrorist and non-terrorist activities and the analysis pertains to how these choices are impacted by defensive and offensive counter-terrorism measures.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-96577-8_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_11

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