Shareholder Engagement and Monitoring Market Activity

Poul Lykkesfeldt () and Laurits Louis Kjaergaard ()

Chapter Chapter 27 in Investor Relations and ESG Reporting in a Regulatory Perspective, 2022, pp 227-229 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The board of directors must look after the interests of all of the shareholders of the company. This chapter explores how the IRO can facility a proactive shareholder engagement in the company. The board of directors may thus not oppose an offer for the company’s shares if this offer is in the interests of the shareholders and the company. Whether this is complied with in practice in all cases can be discussed. It has been seen that some companies, e.g. companies controlled by a foundation, a family or another major shareholder, have prioritised interests that are not necessarily in line with those of minority shareholders, which usually prioritise the highest share price. In some cases, this may lead to an intervention of the stock exchange or the local financial authorities. Finally, the concept of good corporate governance is dealt with in this chapter.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Market activity; Equity story; Voting rights; Short positions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-05800-4_27

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-05800-4_27

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