 Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and Its ComplianceRafael Leal-Arcas ()
Chapter Chapter 6 in International Trade Relations of the European Union, 2022, pp 115-127 from Springer Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides an evaluation of the division of competences between the European Union and its Member States, using some non-legal criteria, where we shall see how the Member States have delegated their authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the supranational level. The delegation of competences in the EU can be explained through the Principal-Agent theory. This theory has only recently been applied to the context of international trade negotiations. According to this theory, agency costs can be due, inter alia, to information asymmetries. In other words, agents know more about their duties than their principals do. In the context of negotiations, we would speak of agency costs because the negotiator knows more than the principal about the constraints of external negotiations. Often, agency costs also may occur because the agent’s interests may not be the same as those of her or his principals. The challenge is to create institutional arrangements to minimize such agency costs. Keywords: Distribution of powers; Compliance; Clarity; Transparency; Accountability; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-14076-1_6 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-14076-1_6 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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