The Art and Beauty of Voting Power

Sascha Kurz (), Alexander Mayer () and Stefan Napel
Additional contact information
Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth
Alexander Mayer: University of Bayreuth

A chapter in Power and Responsibility, 2023, pp 125-141 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple votes in a committee decide between three options by plurality rule, Borda’s rule, and antiplurality rule, or one of the many scoring rules in between. A priori influence on outcomes is quantified in terms of how players’ probabilities are pivotal for the committee decision compared to a dictator. The resulting numbers are represented in triangles that map out structurally equivalent voting weights. Their geometry and color variation reflect fundamental differences between voting rules, such as their inclusiveness and transparency.

Keywords: Weighted voting; Weighted committee games; Scoring rules; Simple voting games; Collective choice; D71; C71; C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-23015-8_7

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031230158

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23015-8_7

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().