Political Coercion and Cliometrics

Øivind Schøyen
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Øivind Schøyen: The School of Business and Economics, UiT The Artic University of Norway, UIT

A chapter in Handbook of Cliometrics, 2024, pp 2165-2208 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract States can use various negative incentive schemes against non-state morality groups. When the strength of this pressure is sufficiently strong to be labeled malignant, these measures fall within the definition of political coercion surveyed in this chapter. The survey focuses on a selection of rational actor theories explaining the macro-level political coercion published in the last 20 years. We also refer to literature in adjacent fields aimed at creating an understanding of political coercion. Some of the theories explain outcomes that relate to the absence of political coercion, that is democracy, state-society balance, and liberty.

Keywords: Coercion; Legitimacy; Cultural economics; Authoritarian regimes; Morality; Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-35583-7_82

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-35583-7_82

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