The Burden of Collective Action and Private Solutions

Byron B. Carson, III ()

Chapter Chapter 5 in Challenging Malaria, 2023, pp 65-87 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents a more detailed discussion of collective action in general and a more formal model of collective action as it relates to mosquito control. The history of ideas related to collective is discussed briefly, which clarifies the nature of the problem and potential solutions. To make a stronger argument about the extent to which individuals can voluntarily provide mosquito control, the analysis of Gordon Tullock is presented and critiqued. Tullock argues that local and regional governments tend to have a comparative advantage in producing mosquito control. He ignores, however, the quasi-public nature of mosquito control and the many ways people can alter the incentives they face. Such incentives are essential to understand collective action problems and add to the conditions under which individuals overcome such problems. With such conditions in mind, people are more likely to turn mosquito control from innate, burdensome dilemmas into opportunities for coordination and public health improvements.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-39510-9_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-39510-9_5

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