Paternalism Versus Autonomy in Regulation: The Naïf, the Slicker, and the Busybody

David Ress ()
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David Ress: University of New England

Chapter Chapter 1 in The Kansas Blue Sky Act of 1911, 2023, pp 1-12 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The first comprehensive effort to regulate the sale of stocks and bonds to the public, the Kansas Blue Sky Act of 1911, substituted the judgment of a state official for the investor’s, unlike the regulatory approach adopted with the U.S. Securities Act of 1933. The Act’s paternalism was acceptable for a time because it reflected the values and patterns of commerce of small rural communities like the home of the Act’s author, Kansas Banking Commissioner Joseph N. Dolley. The stories Dolley told about innocents who were taken in tapped still-important popular belief. But the Kansas model was rejected eventually because the ease of buying and selling shares on stock exchanges and the many tales of easy money to be made through speculation presented Blue Sky Act regulation as a paternalistic overreach of state power.

Keywords: Kansas; Securities regulation; Fraud; Blue Sky Act; Securities sales; Paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-43831-8_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-43831-8_1

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