Authoritarian Institutions

Georgy Egorov () and Konstantin Sonin ()
Additional contact information
Georgy Egorov: Northwestern University
Konstantin Sonin: University of Chicago

Chapter 10 in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2025, pp 209-236 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Political institutions of authoritarianism are designed to ensure the elite’s lasting hold of power. They might be growth-enhancing at certain stages of a country’s development and become a major obstacle to economic progress in other stages, but their primary role is to keep the elite unaccountable. Thirty years ago, the economic collapse of the USSR-led communist system gave a hope for the “end of history,” the convergence of all political systems to a democracy. Since then, the share of nondemocracies has stabilized after a dramatic fall; their share of the world’s GDP has been increasing, largely due to China’s enormous contribution. In this essay, we focus on institutional connections between the monopoly on political power and the monopolistic, centralized organization of economic life under authoritarianism.

Keywords: Authoritarian regimes; Dictatorship; Extractive institutions; Multiple equilibria; Information manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-50810-3_10

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031508103

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_10

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().