Contracting with Public Authorities: Recent Developments

Jean Beuve () and Stéphane Saussier ()
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Jean Beuve: University of Lille
Stéphane Saussier: University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Chapter 26 in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2025, pp 651-672 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Recent theoretical and empirical developments suggest that public contracts are characterized by intrinsic differences from private contracts, due to significant oversight and control by political opponents and interest groups, who have an interest in challenging and disrupting the contractual relationship. As a result, public contracts are more rigid and more frequently renegotiated than private contracts. This chapter provides a brief progress report on these recent studies and highlights the need to improve the tools currently available to public procurement departments by introducing more flexibility at the award stage (e.g., negotiation, discretion at the award stage) and at the execution stage (e.g., renegotiation of contracts). The appropriate utilization of this higher flexibility is contingent upon the quality of the institutional framework, as well as the integrity and competencies of public officials.

Keywords: Public procurement; Public contract; Public scrutiny; Contractual rigidity; Renegotiation; Discretion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_26

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