Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion, and Mobilization

Gary W. Cox ()
Additional contact information
Gary W. Cox: Stanford University

Chapter 6 in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2025, pp 105-127 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How does changing the rules of electoral competition change parties’ and candidates’ strategies? This chapter considers three kinds of rule changes—those that increase the effective number of votes per voter, the effective number of seats per district, and the proportionality of the votes-to-seats mapping(s)—and focuses on three types of campaign strategy: those that address the challenges of coordinating, persuading and mobilizing voters.

Keywords: Electoral coordination; Spatial competition; Strategic mobilization; M + 1 rule; Cross-district coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-50810-3_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031508103

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().