Match-Fixing

David Forrest ()
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David Forrest: University of Liverpool

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Palgrave Handbook on the Economics of Manipulation in Sport, 2024, pp 85-112 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The chapter distinguishes three motives for match-fixing: to secure a sporting objective for a player or team; to change events on the field to enhance the interests of the competition organiser; and to allow gains from the betting market for parties within or outside the sport. Each type of match-fixing is viewed through the lens of economics. In the case of betting fixes, the framework adopted is that of a simple supply-demand model. The supply of fixes comes from actors within the sport and demand originates with criminals who seek to manipulate matches for betting gain. This framework allows both the identification of matches and competitions at greatest risk and insight into why there appears to have been a step increase in fixing since the Millennium, the latter closely related to a changing betting market. The framework also informs discussion of policy approaches to prevention, detection and mitigation of match-fixing.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-63581-6_5

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