Trusting Science: Is There Reasonable Distrust of Reputable Scientific Authority?

Brittany A. Gentry ()
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Brittany A. Gentry: Utah State University, Department of Communications and Philosophy

A chapter in The Science and Art of Simulation, 2024, pp 43-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Is there reasonable distrust of reputable scientific authority? This paper considers the role of experience in the epistemic process of trusting authority and argues that distrust based on experience mirrors rational processes of belief formation and so produces rational, though sometimes wrong, beliefs. Part one establishes the importance of experience in the basic process of developing trust in authority and in formal epistemologies. Part two considers four ways in which people experience scientific authorities: (1) expertise, (2) distinguishing between individual and group identity, (3) shared identities, and (4) transparency. Given the role of experience in trust formation, the paper concludes that in some cases where non-scientific communities have negative experiences of scientific authority and distrust a reputable scientific authority, those communities have, prima facie, a rational distrust and are likely to distrust.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-68058-8_3

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