Utility in Behavioural Economics

Han Bleichrodt ()
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Han Bleichrodt: University of Alicante

Chapter Chapter 4 in Behavioural Economics, 2025, pp 51-74 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The deviations from rationality he and Tversky observed, made Kahneman reconsider the meaning of rational choice. Economics defines rationality as consistency with a set of axioms, but without any reference to the consequences of choices. Sen (1993) made a similar point. He argued that rationality of choice cannot be defined without reference to something external to an agent’s choices, like objectives, values, or norms.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-69166-9_4

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