Concluding Remarks and Some Recommendations: The Consequences of the EU’s “de-risking” Strategy for the World Order

René W.H. van der Linden () and Piotr Łasak ()
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René W.H. van der Linden: The Hague University of Applied Sciences
Piotr Łasak: Jagiellonian University

Chapter Chapter 8 in Sino-EU Economic Relations, 2024, pp 181-192 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The US and the EU have benefited enormously in recent decades from the rise of China as a driving force in the global economy. It was rapidly transformed from a low-wage manufacturing to an advanced high-tech industrial country, spurred by initiatives such as “Made in China 2025”, and its self-reliance-oriented “dual circulation” policy. China’s more dominant role on the world stage initially spread its foreign policy and political values through “soft power” without the use of coercion, but in recent years increasingly through an assertive “hard power” approach which through its economic, technological, and military strength also has caused increasing global tensions. This change in the structure of China’s more innovation- and high-tech services-oriented economy has intensified competition with the EU, especially in sectors crucial to the EU’s green and digital transition. Now China has a comparable share of global GDP in this decade as the US and the EU and other emerging markets are following suit, there is a greater desire for a multipolar (Chinese-centric) world order. In such world countries refrain from interfering in the internal politics of other countries, the notion of “universal values” is viewed with scepticism and the hegemony of the Western-led order dominated by the US and its allies no longer applies and liberalism and democracy can no longer be taken for granted. The EU’s “de-risking” approach in this context can also be seen as a response to the trend towards a more multipolar economic and security world order. It is a way to simultaneously find a better balance between the transatlantic alliance with the US and cooperation with China, by seizing opportunities and managing risks through a “three-pronged approach” consisting of the pillars of protection, promotion, and partnering. In the coming years, it will therefore be a complex and delicate balancing act for EU policymakers to strike a skilful balance between being neither too defensive nor too offensive in addressing the dependencies, risks, and vulnerabilities in supply chains, without falling into too much protectionism and threatening the current world order.

Keywords: “Soft power” versus “hard power” approach; China’s industrial policy; “Made in China 2025” strategy; Middle-income trap; “Dual circulation” policy; “Self-reliance” in strategic sectors; Innovation-driven economy; “Civil-military fusion”; Risk mitigation approach; EU’s three-pronged approach; Proactive common industrial policy; Multipolar world order; Strategic independence; Dual-use technologies; Global economic and security order; Multilateral organizations; EU-US-China triangle; Global Gateway strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-71814-4_8

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