Schiller’s Wallenstein and the Trap of Power

Manfred J. Holler () and Barbara Klose-Ullmann ()
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Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg
Barbara Klose-Ullmann: Center of Conflict Resolution (CCR)

Chapter Chapter 5 in Strategic Games on Stage, 2025, pp 85-109 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract ThisTrap of Power chapter wants to be both an introduction to game-theoretical thinking as well as a game-theoretical discussion of Schiller’s WallensteinWallenstein. Note that the intention of this article is to convince theater goers and people who work in the theatrical arts that it is worthwhile to study some game theory. Others will hopefully profit from the unusual WallensteinWallenstein interpretation. It is not this article’s purpose to teach game theorists, but rather to inspire applications. The drama is depicted as a game and consequently submitted to a formal analysis that is based on the economic concept of rationalityRationality. Weber’sWeber, Max definition of powerPower is operationalized to show the rather ambivalent relationship of powerPower and choice that haunted WallensteinWallenstein, driving him to his fatal end.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-82945-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-82945-1_5

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