Governance of Corporate Groups

Marco Bodellini () and Massimo Paolo Gentili ()
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Marco Bodellini: University of Bergamo and PwC Legal
Massimo Paolo Gentili: Gentili & Partners

Chapter 4 in The Governance of Luxembourg Investment Vehicles, Asset Managers, and Asset Owners, 2026, pp 127-164 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter explores the rationale and legal concept of corporate groups, which are coordinated economic organizations composed of legally separate entities. While Luxembourg lacks a single codified “group law,” the chapter discusses how domestic law indirectly accommodates groups through accounting, audit, and prudential regulations. It examines different organizational architectures, such as pyramidal structures and holding forms, and discusses the governance trade-offs between centralized and decentralized control systems. The chapter also addresses the management of intragroup and related-party transactions.

Keywords: Corporate groups; Parent-subsidiary; Pyramidal structure; Holding form; Group interest; Internal control; Risk management; Consolidated reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-032-31062-0_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-31062-0_4

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