Two-person zero-sum games

Nicolai N. Vorob’ev
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Nicolai N. Vorob’ev: Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 3 in Foundations of Game Theory, 1994, pp 209-357 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract 1.1 Two-person zero-sum games. In this chapter we discuss two-person zero-sum games, i.e. systems of the form $$ \Gamma = \left\langle {x,y,H} \right\rangle , $$ where x and y are arbitrary disjoint sets (cf. 1.1 of Chapter 1), which are called sets of strategies of players 1 and 2, together with H : x × y → R, the payoff function. Here the pairs (x,y) ∈ x × y are called situations in Γ, and the number H(x, y) is the payoff to player 1 (or the loss to player 2) in the situation (x, y). □

Keywords: Saddle Point; Optimal Strategy; Payoff Function; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-0348-8514-0_5

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