Matrix games

Nicolai N. Vorob’ev
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Nicolai N. Vorob’ev: Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 4 in Foundations of Game Theory, 1994, pp 359-456 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract 1.1 Matrix games. In 4, Chapter 1, a matrix game was defined as a finite two-person zero-sum game, i.e., as a game Γ = 〈x,y,H〉 in which the sets 〈x and y of the players’ strategies are finite. Unless the contrary is stated, we shall also always suppose that x = {1, ..., m} and y = {1,... ,n}.

Keywords: Saddle Point; Optimal Strategy; Linear Programming Problem; Convex Cone; Mixed Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-0348-8514-0_6

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