Preferring Stronger Parties to Weaker Parties: Majorization

Friedrich Pukelsheim
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Friedrich Pukelsheim: Universität Augsburg, Institut für Mathematik

Chapter Chapter 8 in Proportional Representation, 2014, pp 110-116 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Majorization provides a partial order of apportionment methods. When passing from one method to another, every group of stronger parties gets more seats and the complementary group of weaker parties fewer seats, or they keep what they have. Specifically, one divisor method majorizes another if and only if their signpost ratios are strictly increasing.

Keywords: Vote Share; Weak Parti; Strict Monotonicity; Single Party; Strong Parti (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-03856-8_8

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