Fair Elections; Polls; Amendments

W. D. Wallis
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W. D. Wallis: Southern Illinois University, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 4 in The Mathematics of Elections and Voting, 2014, pp 33-45 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We have seen several different electoral systems. Even in a small election, the same preferences can give rise to a different results depending on the system used. In this section we shall present an extreme case of how the method chosen might affect the outcome of an election in a realistic situation. This means that an electoral system could be chosen in order to favor one or another candidate.

Keywords: Electoral System; Condorcet Winner; Strategic Vote; Preference Profile; Prefer Candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-09810-4_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09810-4_4

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