Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

W. D. Wallis
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W. D. Wallis: Southern Illinois University, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Mathematics of Elections and Voting, 2014, pp 47-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In many voting systems, each voter must produce a ranked preference order of all candidates mentioned, and no ties are allowed. Such systems are called ordinal ordinal voting system . However some voting systems, called cardinal cardinal voting system , allow the voters to evaluate candidates separately, and a voter could say two candidates were equal. For the moment we shall concentrate on ordinal systems; cardinal systems will be studied in Chap. 7 .

Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem; Rank Order Preference; Cardinal System; Electoral System; Preference Ranking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09810-4_5

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