Weighted Voting

W. D. Wallis
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W. D. Wallis: Southern Illinois University, Department of Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 8 in The Mathematics of Elections and Voting, 2014, pp 79-87 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Most elections involve electorates sufficiently large that ties are extremely unlikely. However, some situations, particularly committees, involve small numbers of voters. In this chapter we shall discuss some of these cases.

Keywords: Winning Coalition; European Economic Community; Veto Power; Minimal Winning Coalition; Practice Exercise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09810-4_8

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