Institutions and Collaborative Innovation
Chander Velu ()
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Chander Velu: University of Cambridge
A chapter in Adoption of Innovation, 2015, pp 95-108 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract This paper explores the importance of developing institutions as a means to govern collaborative innovation among stakeholders such as individuals and firms. We argue that institutions are a key element in the creation of markets to enable and sustain collaborative innovation. Institutions can be both informal and formal. Informal institutions include conventions, moral rules and social norms whereby there is no external enforcer. Formal institutions need external enforcement by a third party. We use the prisoner’s dilemma game and the empirical results from it as an analogy to draw lessons about how institutions could be developed to enhance collaborative innovations. We use case vignettes to illustrate our findings. We draw implications for managers to shape the institutional structure for collaboration by demonstrating the importance of fairness, reciprocity, development of social capital and understanding demographic characteristics of the participants. In addition, we show when participants are less homogenous, a formal external agency is needed to encourage collaboration.
Keywords: Innovation; Collaboration; Institutions; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-14523-5_7
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-14523-5_7
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