Nominalism, the nonexistence of mathematical objects

Jody Azzouni ()
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Jody Azzouni: Tufts University, Department of Philosophy

A chapter in Mathematics, Substance and Surmise, 2015, pp 133-145 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Nominalism is the view that, despite appearances, there are no mathematical entities. The ways that nominalism is both compatible with there being mathematical truths and falsehoods, and compatible with mathematical truths being valuable in scientific applications are explored in this paper. Some of the purely psychological reasons for why nominalism is so hard to believe in will also be discussed.

Keywords: Mathematical Statement; Scientific Theory; Mathematical Object; Euclidean Geometry; Empirical Application (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-21473-3_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-21473-3_7

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