Shortest Path to Mechanism Design

Rudolf Müller () and Marc Uetz ()
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Rudolf Müller: Maastricht University, Department of Quantitative Economics
Marc Uetz: University of Twente, Department of Applied Mathematics

A chapter in Gems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms, 2015, pp 83-94 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Mechanism design is concerned with computing desired outcomes in situations where data is distributed among selfish agents. We discuss some of the most fundamental questions in the design of mechanisms, and derive simple answers by interpreting the problem in graph-theoretic terms. Specifically, much of mechanism design is thereby reformulated as shortest path problems.

Keywords: Allocation Rule; Type Space; Type Graph; True Type; Vickrey Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-24971-1_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24971-1_8

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