A Network Design Model Under Uncertainty

E. D’Amato (), E. Daniele () and L. Mallozzi ()
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E. D’Amato: Seconda Università degli Studi di Napoli, Dipartimento di Ingegneria Industriale e dell’Informazione
E. Daniele: Fraunhofer Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik - IWES
L. Mallozzi: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Departments of Mathematics and Applications “R. Caccioppoli”

A chapter in Contributions in Mathematics and Engineering, 2016, pp 81-93 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we present a cooperative game theoretical model for the well-known problem of network design. There is a multi-commodity network flow problem for each subset of players, who optimize the design of the network. Each player receives a return for shipping his commodity, and we consider the possibility to have uncertainty in this return. A cooperative game under interval uncertainty is presented for the model, and the existence of core solutions and approximate core solutions is investigated.

Keywords: Network Design; Cooperative Game; Network Design Problem; Pheromone Trail; Core Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-31317-7_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-31317-7_5

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