How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics?: An Open Problem

Eric Maskin ()
Additional contact information
Eric Maskin: Harvard University, Littauer Center, Department of Economics

A chapter in Open Problems in Mathematics, 2016, pp 347-350 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Game Theory pioneers J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern gave most of their attention to the cooperative side of the subject. But cooperative game theory has had relatively little effect on economics. In this essay, I suggest why that might be and what is needed for cooperative theory to become more relevant to economics.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Cooperative Game; Grand Coalition; Noncooperative Game; Cooperative Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-32162-2_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319321622

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32162-2_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().