The Political Economy of Health Care

Peter Zweifel (), Friedrich Breyer and Mathias Kifmann ()
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Peter Zweifel: University of Zurich
Mathias Kifmann: University of Augsburg

Chapter 13 in Health Economics, 2009, pp 429-446 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Whenever a normative statement was made in Chapters 5 to 12, it was based on the efficiency criteria of welfare economics. This left open the issue of whether a Pareto-optimal design of a health care system might ever be achieved. Therefore, this chapter raises the question of what determines the actual (rather than any desired) institutional structure of a health care system. This type of question is the topic of ‘Political Economy’, also known as ‘Public Choice’. This is a comparatively recent field of theoretical and empirical research into behavior in the political domain.1 With regard to health policy and regulation, the following agents can be distinguished.

Keywords: Public Choice; Majority Vote; Public Health Insurance; Private Health Insurance; Professional Association (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68540-1_13

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