Optimal Health Insurance Contracts

Peter Zweifel (), Friedrich Breyer and Mathias Kifmann ()
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Peter Zweifel: University of Zurich
Mathias Kifmann: University of Augsburg

Chapter 6 in Health Economics, 2009, pp 203-252 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chapter 5, several reasons were presented and discussed as to why a developed society may decide to have social health insurance with compulsory membership. This means that individuals are not completely free in deciding the amount of their insurance coverage against the cost of illness, since they are not permitted to have less than a minimum level of protection.

Keywords: Optimal Insurance; Marginal Utility; Moral Hazard; Disposable Income; Health Care Expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68540-1_6

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