Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization

Gary W. Cox
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Gary W. Cox: University of California

Chapter 4 in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2008, pp 69-89 from Springer

Abstract: In the Schumpeterian conception, democracy consists of regular and non-violent competition for control of government between alternative teams of elites (Schumpeter 1942). The question that much scholarship in electoral studies addresses, and on which this essay will focus, is: how does changing the rules of the electoral game change the strategies of parties and candidates, hence the outcome of elections?

Keywords: Electoral System; Vote Share; Political Competition; Voter Turnout; Party System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_5

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