Coalition Formation, Agenda Selection, and Power

Friedel Bolle and Yves Breitmoser
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Yves Breitmoser: Europa University Viadrina

Chapter 10. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 185-208 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In a wide range of political systems, decision making requires the support of a majority. When majorities are backed by coalitions, then they are organized either for a given period of time or on a case by case basis (i.e. for single proposals). In Germany, for instance, minority governments are rare and the first case prevails. In any case, there may be a unique party that is entitled to form a coalition (called formateur), or any party may be entitled to do so. We are interested in the non-cooperative treatment of a formateur model, and based on this, we want to discuss bargaining power.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Vote Share; Aspiration Level; American Political Science Review; Stable Coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_10

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