The Power to Propose versus the Power to Oppose

Donald Wittman

Chapter 13. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 245-258 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we compare proposal power to veto power within the context of a majority-rule voting system, such as a legislature. To illustrate the issues involved, consider the following scenario: P can propose a bill, which is then enacted if a majority (M) of legislators vote in favour of the bill and V (for veto player) agrees to its passage. P could stand for the committee system in the US House of Representatives, where a committee brings a bill to the floor of the house. V would then stand for the president who can veto a bill.1 And even if the President does not veto the bill, the Supreme Court might find the bill unconstitutional. So the Supreme Court can be seen as a veto player, as well. When does the proposer have more power than the veto player? More generally, what is the outcome if there are several proposers and/or veto players?

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_13

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